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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Nickersons have listed a total of 17 issues on appeal. A review of those issues shows
that many, if not all, are attempts to re-litigate the underlying grant of summary judgment and
final judgment in favor of Respondent which was upheld by this Court in PHH Mortgage v.
Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388 (2016) (hereinafter "Nickerson I").

Based upon the procedural

posture of this case and the law of the case doctrine, the issues on appeal are rephrased as
follows:
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' various

post-judgment motions including a motion for sanctions, motion to quash execution and
judgment, and motion to vacate or amend order of sale and decree of foreclosure. ·
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether respondent is entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case

This is the second appeal by the Nickersons seeking to interfere with and avoid the
judicial foreclosure of approximately 50 acres of land in Clearwater County, Idaho commonly
known as 3165 Neff Road, Orofino, ID 83544 ("the Property"). The Nickersons encumbered the
Property with a Deed of Trust which Respondent sought to foreclose when the Nickersons
defaulted on their payment obligations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Respondent on April 4, 2014 which this Court upheld on appeal in PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson,
160 Idaho 388 (2016) (hereinafter "Nickerson l").
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Following remittitur of this case, Respondent sought and obtained an order from the trial
court lifting a stay on enforcement of the trial court judgment and a order of sale and decree of
foreclosure and writ.

In opposition, the Nickersons continued to challenge the underlying

summary judgment and final judgment through a motion to quash execution and judgment and a
motion for sanctions. The Nickersons also challenged the form of the order of sale through a
motion to vacate or amend order of sale. The district court correctly denied the Nickersons'
motions recognizing that they were merely attempts to re-litigate the issues already decided in
Nickerson 1. The present appeal followed.
Factual and Procedural Background

The Court already set forth the relevant factual summary in PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson,
160 Idaho 388 (2016) (hereinafter "Nickerson I"), as follows:
In October of 2002, Charles and Donna Nickerson (the Nickersons) purchased
approximately 50 acres of land in Clearwater County, Idaho. The Nickersons
executed a promissory note and a Deed of Trust in favor of Coldwell Banker
Mortgage in the principal sum of $285,000. The district court determined that the
original loan to the Nickersons was made by Coldwell Banker Mortgage and was
originally serviced by Mortgage Service Center. In December of 2002, the note
was assigned to Fannie Mae, and J.P. Morgan Chase acquired the note in
November of 2007, at which point Chase Home Financial began servicing the
loan. In February of 2010, Mortgage Service Center resumed responsibility for
loan servicing, and in June of 2010, Chase assigned the note to PHH. As of
December 1, 2013, the amount due on the note, including interest, was
$340,339.84.

On January 10, 2011, PHH filed a complaint against the Nickersons claiming that
the Nickersons had defaulted on their loan and seeking to foreclose. On August
12, 2011, the Nickersons answered the complaint. On February 1, 2012, the
Nickersons filed an amended answer, counterclaim, and third-party complaint
against Chase. The Nickersons' answer, counterclaim, and third party complaint
alleged, among other things: breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
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breach of note, breach of 12 U.S.C. § 2605, breach of the federal fair debt
collection practices act, breach of the federal fair credit reporting act. In addition
to these claims, the Nickersons also sought an award of punitive damages. On
October 16, 2012, PHH and Chase each filed motions for summary judgment.
On November 16, 2012, the district court granted in part and denied in part PHH's
motion for summary judgment and granted Chase's motion for summary
judgment ...
In its partial denial of PHH's motion for summary judgment, the district court
stated: "PHH's motion for summary judgment should be granted as to all of the
Nickersons' counterclaims for failure to present any evidence to support the
elements of those counterclaims, and/or the counterclaims are not proper because
the cited statutes do not apply to the facts of this case. Summary judgment should
also be granted as to the Nickersons' affirmative defense .... " However, the
district court determined there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the Nickersons were in default in 2010 when PHH acquired its interest in the
Nickersons' loan.

On December 5, 2012, the Nickersons filed a motion to reconsider. The motion
stated that supporting documentation would soon be filed; however, on February
5, 2013, the district court denied the motion because the Nickersons had not
presented a supporting memorandum following the motion.
On February 25, 2013, the Nickersons' attorney moved to withdraw. On May 15,
2013, the district court granted the withdrawal motion, and on August 19, 2013,
the Nickersons filed a notice of appearance pro se.
On November 12, 2013, PHH filed a second motion for summary judgment, again
contending that the Nickersons were in default and that they had not presented
evidence to the contrary. On December 17, 2013, the Nickersons filed their own
motion for summary judgment, supported by the affidavit of Charles Nickerson.
PHH moved to strike the affidavit, and the district court granted the motion in
part. The district court set the hearing on the cross-motions for summary
judgment for February 11, 2014. On February 5, 2014, the Nickersons filed an
unsuccessful motion to continue the hearing.
On April 4, 2014, the district court issued its order and final judgment granting
PHH's motion for summary judgment and denying the Nickersons' motion for
summary judgment. The district court concluded that the Nickersons had not
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presented evidence to support their conclusory allegation that they had not
defaulted on their loan obligation.
Following judgment, the Nickersons filed three motions to reconsider and a
motion for leave to amend their answer, counterclaim, third-party complaint and
demand for a jury trial. On May 6, 2014, the district court issued an order denying
the Nickersons' motions to reconsider, ruling them either untimely or inapplicable
to a final judgment.
On May 15, 2014, the Nickersons filed a "Motion for Justice" in Clearwater
County Idaho, and on May 16, 2014, the Nickersons filed a motion to suppress
and strike the depositions of Charles and Donna Nickerson, which had been taken
on October 3, 2012, prior to the initial motion for summary judgment.
On May 16, 2014, the Nickersons filed their notice of appeal. Subsequently, on
June 6, 2014, the Nickersons filed a motion for relief with the district court. On
June II, 2014, the district court denied the Nickersons' motions for justice and
relief. The district court treated the motions as motions to reconsider and
concluded that the Nickersons still had not presented any admissible evidence that
would create a genuine issue of material fact.
On October 6, 2014, the Nickersons returned to the district court and filed a
motion for relief from judgment or order. The Nickersons argued for relief under
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(l)-(3), and (6). Two weeks later, the
Nickersons followed up by filing a motion to set aside judgment based on
supplemental evidence of fraud on the court, filed October 21, 2014, and an edited
motion to set aside judgment filed October 22, 2014. Those motions were both
based on a claim of fraud under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). The
Nickersons argued they were entitled to relief based on: mistakes by the court;
surprise due to the actions and withdrawal of their former counsel; excusable
neglect due to their reliance on their former counsel; new evidence showing PHH
did not have standing to pursue foreclosure; fraud regarding PHH's chain of title,
the amount of default, and coercion of the Nickersons at closing; and misconduct
of the opposing parties regarding the depositions of the Nickersons and the
submission of a fraudulent affidavit. The district court denied the Nickersons'
motions, concluding that the Nickersons failed to present admissible evidence to
support their claims.
PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 391-392, (2016).
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In Nickerson 1, this Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of Respondent finding there to be no support in the record for the Nickersons' contention
that Respondent lacked standing or that the Nickersons were not in default. Id., 160 Idaho at 392.
This Court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
Nickersons'

motion to continue the summary judgment hearing, their motions for

reconsideration, and their Rule 60(b) motions to set aside judgment. Lastly, this Court found that
the Nickersons had raised a number of issues on appeal that had been waived, or were not
properly before the Court. Id., 160 Idaho at 399. The Nickersons subsequently filed a Petition
for Rehearing on May 18, 2016, which was denied on July 19, 2016, and a Remittitur was issued
on July 22, 2016. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R. _"), pg. 2.)
Following the conclusion of Nickerson 1, on February 28, 2017, Respondent moved to
lift a stay on enforcement previously entered by the district court on October 15, 2015 pending
the outcome of the appeal so that it could obtain an appropriate writ of execution and order of
sale in order to complete the underlying judicial foreclosure and carry out the Judgment. (Id.) In
response, the Nickersons filed a response in opposition (R. pgs. 4-107), a motion for sanctions
(R. pgs. 108-196), and a motion to quash execution and judgment (R. pgs. 197-199).
On April 13, 2017, the district court issued a written Order denying all of the Nickersons'
motions. (R. pgs. 200-202.)

It also entered an Order lifting the stay of execution of the

Judgment of foreclosure (R. pgs. 203-204), and entering an Order of Sale .and Decree of
Foreclosure (R. pgs. 205-209). On April 25, 2017 a writ of execution was then issued. (R. pg. 3.)

-5-

Un-deterred, on April 27, 2017, the Nickersons filed a motion to vacate or to amend the
order of sale and decree of foreclosure (R. pgs. 210-214.), and a motion to reconsider the court's
April 13, 2017 denial of their motion to quash execution and judgment and for sanctions (R. pgs.
215-224). Both motions were again denied by the district court on May 16, 2017. (R. pgs. 225226 and 227-228.)
On May 25, 2017, the Nickersons filed a document entitled Notice ofissues (R. pgs. 229234 ), and a notice of appeal from the following district court orders:
Order of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure, filed April 13, 2017;
Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution and Judgment and Motion for Sanctions,
filed April 13, 2017;
Order Lifting Stay, filed April 13, 2017; 1
Order Denying Motion to Vacate or Amend Order of Sale and Decree of foreclosure,
filed May 16, 2017; and
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution and
Judgment, filed May 16, 2017. 2
(R., pgs. 235:ln 29 -pg.236:ln ..4.)
Notwithstanding the Nickersons' notice of appeal, the judicial foreclosure process
continued forward and a Sheriffs Sale of the Property was set for August 25, 2017, which the
Nickersons sought to stay by filing an emergency motion to stay with this Court on or about

1
While the Nickersons identified the order lifting stay as one of the district court orders being appealed, they have
provided no authority or argument supporting any errors with the subject order, such that the issue is waived. Trotter
v. Bank of New York Mellon, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012).

2

The Nickersons present no authority or argument with respect to the district court's denial of their motion to
reconsider such that the issue has been waived on appeal. Id.
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August 21, 2017. By written order this Court denied Appellants' request for stay on August 25,
2017 and the Sheriffs Sale took place where the Property was purchased by Respondent. 3
ARGUMENT

The Nickersons have already lost an appeal of the district court's grant of summary
judgment and final judgment in favor of Respondent which authorized the Property to be
judicially foreclosed upon and sold at a Sheriffs Sale.

Based upon this Court's ruling in

Nickerson 1, the Nickersons' continued attempts to re-litigate whether summary judgment and

final judgment were appropriately entered are improper and barred under the law of the case
doctrine. The district court recognized the same when it denied the Nickersons' various postjudgment motions filed in opposition to Respondent's request to obtain the necessary writ and
order of sale to complete the judicial foreclosure of the Property.
As is discussed in greater detail below, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied the Nickersons' motion for sanctions, motion to quash execution and judgment, and
motion to vacate or amend the order of sale and decree of foreclosure. Accordingly, the district
court's decisions should be affirmed and this case brought to an end.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Nickersons fail to set forth the correct standard of review to be applied to this matter
primarily citing to the standard of review for summary judgment which this Court already
decided in Nickerson J. Rather, the Nickersons' attempts to challenge the underlying judgment
3

Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale which was recorded in the Clearwater
County land records on August 28, 2017, as Instrument No.231642. The certificate of sale notes that the Property
was sold in one lot or parcel to the Respondent and that the Property is subject to a I year redemption period
because it is more than 20 acres. See J.C.§ 11-403.
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and have it set aside post appeal, or to have sanctions issued based upon their conclusory
arguments that summary judgment was improperly entered, are more accurately characterized as
requests for relief from the final judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b).
Thus de nova review is not the appropriate standard. Rather, the appropriate standard of
review is for abuse of discretion. 4 See Printcraft Press, Inc., v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153
Idaho 440,448, 283 P.3d 757, 765 (2012); see also Watson v. Navistar Int'! Transp. Corp., 121
Idaho 643 (1992). The abuse of discretion inquiry examines (1) whether the district judge
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district judge acted within the
outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available; and (3) whether the district judge reached his decision through an
exercise ofreason. See Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,423 (2004).
The Nickersons have presented no factual or legal basis to deviate from the abuse of
discretion standard, and therefore their arguments asking this court to apply a de nova review
should be rejected. Id

II.

THE PRESENT APPEAL IS MOOT.
Appellant filed the present lawsuit in order to stop and/or interfere with the judicial

foreclosure of the Property. Appellant sought to stay the August 28, 2017 Sheriffs Sale of the
Property, which this Court denied. Since no stay applied either based on the filing of this appeal
or by an order of the district court, a Sheriffs Sale of the Property took place on August 28,
2017, and rendered the present appeal moot. Under the mootness doctrine:
4

I.R.C.P. 59(e) does not apply where the various motions seeking to challenge the underlying judgment were filed
more than 14 days after the entry of judgment.
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This Court may dismiss an appeal when it appears that the case involves only a
moot question. A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer
live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. A case is moot
if it presents no justiciable controversy and the judicial determination will have no
practical effect upon the outcome.
State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168, 280 P.3d 1995 (App. 2012).

Specifically, in Eagle Rock

Corporation v. Idamont Hotel Co., 60 Idaho 639 (1939), this Court addressed the impact of a

sheriffs sale in the context of a judicial foreclosure. The Eagle Rock Court noted that when no
undertaking has been given to stay foreclosure proceeding pending appeal, a successful
purchaser is entitled to all the rights and title incident to a sale and issuance of a sheriffs
certificate and that the only property right remaining in the mortgagor is the right of redemption.
Eagle Rock Corporation v. Jdamont Hotel Co., 60 Idaho 639 (1939).

Here, because a Sheriffs Sale has taken place, the Nickersons have lost all rights they
had in the Property, with the exception of their redemption rights, rendering the present appeal
moot. See Eagle Rock Corporation v. Idamont Hotel Co., 60 Idaho 639 (1939).

Stated

differently, where there is no longer a foreclosure proceeding to stay, no longer a deed of trust at
issue, and where the Nickersons have no rights remaining in the Property besides the right of
redemption which they have not exercised, the present appeal is now moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal should be dismissed in its entirety.
III.

THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BARS THE NICKERSONS' ATTEMPTS
TO RE-LITIGATE WHETHER SUMMARY JUDGMENT Al\'D FINAL
JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.
Even if the present appeal were not moot, the majority of the Nickersons'

arguments/issues on appeal are barred by the law of the case doctrine.
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Specifically, Idaho follows the law of the case doctrine. Suitts v. First Sec. Bank, NA.,
110 Idaho 15, 21-22 (1985). That doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding
a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and up on subsequent appeal." Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,
709 (2009); quoting Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 21 (1985). "The
underlying purpose for the doctrine is to "maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of
matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. .. " State v. Dunlap, 155
Idaho 345, 375-376 (2013); citing to Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir.
2005) (quoting 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d

§ 4478, at 637-38 (2002)). The doctrine applies to not only issues actually raised, but "also
prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were
not, raised in the earlier appeal." Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 543 (2003); citing to

Bouten Constr. Co., v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756 (1999).

In this case, the gravamen of the Nickerson's post-judgment motions to the district court,
as well as the issues being raised on appeal, are simply attempts to re-litigate issues already
decided in Nickerson I or which they waived by failing to have raised the arguments in

Nickerson I. Specifically, the Nickersons' Notice of Appeal identifies a total of 12 preliminary
issues on appeal which their opening brief then adds to, bringing the total number of issues to 17.
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Of the 17 issues identified, only 4 of the issues 5 appear to relate to decisions issued by the district
court following this Court's ruling in Nickerson 1. The other 13 issues relate to the underlying
foreclosure action and issues already decided in Nickerson 1.

Indeed, issues D through L

identified in the Notice of Appeal and in the opening brief all explicitly reference issues decided
in Nickerson 1.
By way of further example, in their opening brief, the Nickersons are agam directly
trying to challenge the entry of summary judgment and final judgment based upon allegations
that they were somehow prevented from performance and denied the right to cure or their
contractual rights;6 that the judgment was obtained through fraud, 7 that Respondent lacked
standing, 8 that they were not in default, 9 or that there was misconduct of opposing counse!. 10 In
fact, a review of the Nickersons' opening briefleaves no doubt that they are seeking to re-litigate
issues decided in Nickerson 1, or which they could have raised in that earlier appeal but did not.
Specifically, at pages 32-33 of the Nickersons' opening brief they continue to contest "PHH's
standing" to foreclose and that because PHH did not have the note in its possession, the district
court should have quashed "execution and vacated summary judgment in favor of PHH."
5

On

Specifically, issues A, B, 0 and P, set forth on pages 24-27. Issues A and B appear to pertain to the Nickersons'
motion to vacate or amend the order of sale and decree of foreclosure while issues O and P are new issues being
raised for the first time on appeal in the Nickersons' opening brief.
6

See Appellant's (sic) Brief, pg. 25, issue D.

7

See Id.,, pgs. 25-27, issues E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, and N.

8

See Id., pg. 32-35.

9

See Id., pg. 25, issue E.

10

See Id., pg. 26-27, issue M-N.
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pages 35-41, the Nickersons' continue to argue that the underlying summary judgment and
judgment must be overturned because it was obtained through fraud, or not based upon the
underlying facts.
All of the foregoing arguments were either raised, considered and addressed by this Court
in Nickerson 1, or could have been raised and thus no matter how the Nickersons attempt to
characterize their issues on this appeal or how they attempt to construct or phrase their
arguments, their attempts to re-litigate issues already decided in Nickerson 1 are barred. In fact,
as this Court noted in Nickerson 1, the district court addressed all of the same arguments when it
denied the Nickersons' separate motion for summary judgment claiming, amongst other things,
that:
... the claim that PHH did not have standing was not supported by an evidence;
the Nickersons did not allege fraud as an affirmative defense and ... had not
presented any admissible evidence of fraud; the Nickersons had not presented any
authority in support of their contention that a note cannot be assigned; and the
Nickersons' claim that they were not in default was conclusory and not supported
by any evidence.
PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 393 (2016). This Court then noted that the

Nickersons waived most of the arguments advanced before the trial court in support of their
motion for summary judgment on appeal.
With the foregoing in mind, while the Nickersons may believe that they are entitled to relitigate every decision with which they disagree, the law of the case doctrine prohibits such relitigation and thus limits the permissible scope of this appeal to issues arising since the issuance
of Nickerson 1 which do not implicate the ruling in Nickerson 1. For the foregoing reasons,
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Issues D-N of the Nickersons' appeal and all other arguments advanced by the Nickersons'
contesting the entry of summary judgment and judgment in favor of Respondent, are barred.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE NICKERSONS' VARIO US POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
Following this Court's decision in Nickerson 1, this matter returned to the district court

where PHH moved to lift a previously entered stay on enforcement and to have a necessary order
and writ to execute on the Judgment.

The Nickersons' opposed PHH's request and also

separately filed a motion seeking to quash execution and judgment and a motion seeking
sanctions and later a motion to vacate or amend order of sale and decree of foreclosure. In
support of their motion to quash execution, the Nickersons repeated their arguments related to
lack of standing (R. pg. 6, Sec. 1), lack of default (R. pg. 7, Sec. 2), and denial of a right to cure
(R. pg. 8). The Nickersons also attached a copy of their 95 page Brief in Support of Petition for
Rehearing which this Court had already considered and denied in Nickerson 1. (R. pgs. 12-107.)
The Nickerson' s motion for sanctions against Respondent was based upon their continued
assertion that Respondent lacked standing. (R. pg. 109, In. 28-32.) Because the Nickersons'
motions were merely disguised attempts to re-litigate issues already resolved in Nickerson 1, the
district court denied them all. 11
On appeal, the Nickersons challenge the district court's denial of their motion seeking to
quash execution and judgment, motion for sanctions, and denial of their motion to vacate or

11

The Nickersons have not challenged the district court's decision lifting the stay, nor have they challenged the
district court's denial of their motion to reconsider. Rather, they have focused entirely on the district court's denial
of their motion to quash execution and judgment and their motion for sanctions. Thus, those issues are waived on

appeal.
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amend order of sale and decree of foreclosure. All of the Nickersons' challenges fail as reasons
discussed below. Accordingly, the district court's decisions should be affirmed.
A.

The District Court Properly Denied the Nickersons' Motion to Quash
Execution and Judgment, and Motion for Sanctions.

With respect to the Nickersons' claim that the district court incorrectly denied their
motion to quash execution and judgment and motion for sanctions, the Nickersons' fail to cite to
any authority or portions of the record that demonstrate that the district court abused it's
discretion, nor do they present any argument to support any claimed abuse of discretion. Instead,
as they did before the district court, the Nickersons seek to use their motions and this appeal as a
means ofre-litigating Nickerson I, which is improper.
As an initial starting point, I.AR. 35(a)(6) provides that "the argument shall contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript relied upon." "Issues that are
not argued and supported as required by the Appellate Rules are deemed to have been waived.
Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 326, 297 P.3d 1134, 1143 (2013); citing
to Suitts v. Ni:x, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005)). Similarly, issues on appeal that

are not supported by propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be
considered. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 230, 220 P.3d 580, 587 (2009) (emphasis
added); citing to Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988,
997 (2009). The reasoning behind such a rule "lies in the fact that it is the appellant who has
asserted error on the part of the [trial court]. Absent compliance with the rules, this Court will
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not search the record for error. Error is never presumed on appeal and the burden of showing it is
on the party asserting it." Idaho Power Co., v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 745, 9 P.3d
1204, 1211 (2000). Thus "regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's
brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported
by an cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court. Liponis v. Bach, 149
Idaho 372, 374, 237 P.3d 696, 698 (2010); citing to Inama v. Boise Coutny ex rel. Bd. Of
Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324,330, 63 P.3d 450,456 (2003). "Prose litigants, like all other litigants,
must comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules and standards of appellate practice." Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher, 338 P.3d 556, 580 (2014). Additionally, as set forth above,
once an issued has been ruled upon by this Court, that ruling becomes the law of the case and is
not subject to re-litigation. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 (2009).
With the foregoing in mind, the Nickersons' arguments that the district court erred when
it denied their motion for sanctions and motion to quash execution and judgment are waived and
should not be considered. First, the Nickersons' fail to support their arguments with anything
more than inaccurate conclusory statements and with no legal authority to support their
contention that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside and vacate
summary judgment and final judgment and to impose sanctions on Respondent when the
foregoing decisions were affirmed by this Court in Nickerson I.
Even if not waived, the record below clearly shows that the district court appropriately
exercised its discretion when it denied the Nickersons' motions. Specifically the district court
ruled as follows:
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The appeal is fully resolved and Nickersons are merely attempting to relitigate a
matter that has been through the litigation process. Nickersons have not provided
any factual or legal basis for relief from the Judgment. The Supreme Court has
made the final determination and nothing can be accomplished by this Court
hearing oral argument on either motion. Sanctions are obviously not warranted
against PHH, the prevailing party and Plaintiff is entitled to proceed with
execution of it's Judgment of Foreclosure.
(R. pgs. 200-201.)
Implicit in the district court's decision was the recognition of the binding impact of this
Court's ruling in Nickerson 1 and that because the Nickersons had already unsuccessfully
litigated over whether summary judgment had been appropriately entered in favor of the
Respondent and lost, successive attempts to re-litigate the appeal, regardless of how they are
characterized or what they are called were improper.
Thus, the district court clearly acted within the bounds of its discretion and consistent
with existing law. Accordingly, the district court's decisions should be affirmed.

B.

The District Court Properly Denied the Nickersons' Motion to Vacate or
Amend Order of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure.

On appeal, the Nickersons also challenge the district court's denial of their motion to
vacate or amend the order of sale and decree of foreclosure entered by the district court on April
13, 2017, in two respects. (R. pgs. 205-209.) First, the Nickersons argue on appeal, as they did
before the district court, that their right of redemption entitles them to exclusive possession
during the redemption period. (R. pg. 210-211.)

Second, the Nickersons contend that they

should have been allowed to dictate the order in which the underlying parcels that comprised the
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Property were sold pursuant to LC. § 11-304. The district court denied the Nickersons' motion
and on appeal they raise the same arguments, both of which are without merit.
Turning first to the Nickersons' contention that their right to redemption entitles them to
exclusive possession for the entire redemption period, the Nickersons' argument fails because it
is not ripe and because Idaho case law and statutes addressing redemption rights and the impact
of a Sheriffs sale make clear that the only rights the Nickerson's have in the Property following
a sale are their rights of redemption.
Here, section 11 of the order of sale and decree of foreclosure entered by the district court
provides:
That after the confirmation of the sale of the Subject Property, the purchaser or
purchasers at such sale, or their heirs or assigns, be let into possession of the
premises so sold on production of the certificate of sale or a duly authenticated
copy thereof, and that each and every other party to this action who may be in
possession of the premises, under them or either of them shall deliver to such
grantee or grantees named in such certificate of sale possession of such portion of
the premises as shall be described under the certificate of sale.
(R. pg. 208.) The foregoing section is consistent with Idaho law.
Idaho law provides that a purchaser at a sheriffs sale acquires all the rights, title, and
interest of the judgment debtor subject to the right of redemption. See LC. § 11-309; see also
Eagle Rock Corporation v. Idamont Hotel Co., 60 Idaho 639 (1939). While the Nickersons are

correct that they have a I year right of redemption, 12 nothing in Idaho Code or Idaho law equates
their right of redemption with an unequivocal right of continued possession. See LC. § 11401 (2). Rather, Idaho law makes clear that whatever sticks in the proverbial property rights
12

J.C. § 11-402.
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bundle the Nickersons had, they lost when the underlying Sheriffs sale was completed,
including any right to possession as the fee simple owners of the Property. Thus the impact of
the Sheriff's sale was to convert the Nickersons status as owners of the Property to that of a mere
tenant. See Caldwell v. Thiessen, 60 Idaho 515,519 (1939); adopting Harris v. Reynolds, 13 Cal.
514, (Cal. 1859)(holding that during the year's period of redemption the mortgagor must pay the
purchaser as owner of the land for the use and occupancy thereof.)
In Aker v. Mader, 94 Idaho 94 ( 1971) this Court addressed the rights of a purchaser of
property at a foreclosure sale and found that not only does a purchaser have the right to demand
and receive rents from a the prior mortgagor who fails to vacate during the period of redemption,
but that a mortgagor who fails to pay can be removed. Id., 94 Idaho at 96. In reaching its'
conclusion, the Court examined Idaho Code § 11-407 and Caldwell v. Thiessen, 60 Idaho 515
(1939) and noted that upon purchase of a property at a foreclosure sale, the purchaser obtains all
right title and interest of the mortgagors in the property and that the "only right" remaining
thereafter is the right to re-obtain title through redemption. Aker v. Mader, 94 Idaho at 96
(1971)(emphasis added). The Court further noted that under Idaho Code § 11-407 a purchaser,
from the time of sale until redemption is entitled to receive rents of the property sold, or the
value of the use and occupation thereof from the "tenant in possession" which included a
mortgagor holding over during the period of redemption.
While not directly dispositive of the issue here, the Aker case does identify the rights of a
mortgagor who fails to vacate following a foreclosure sale, such as the Nickersons in this case,

- 18 -

and notes that their only right is that of redemption. Accordingly, the language in the order of
sale that the Nickersons' take issue with is not improper.
Additionally, it should be noted that even if the Nickersons' argument were correct, their
challenge is not ripe. The ripeness dqctrine is to prevent courts from entangling themselves in
purely abstract disagreements. Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 70 (Idaho 2017). Under the ripeness
test, a party must show (1) the case presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real and
substantial controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present need
for adjudication." Id., quoting State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338,342 (2005).
Here there is no evidence in the record that the Nickersons have been divested of
possession prior to the expiration of their redemption rights.

Instead, the Nickersons have

attached to their opening brief as Exhibit 3 a Demand for Possession dated September 13, 2017
and a subsequent letter retracting that demand for possession and there is no evidence in the
record that evidences any action to eject the Nickersons from the Property. Further, there is no
evidence that the Nickersons are at risk of being ejected from the Property before their
redemption period expires.
Accordingly, where the Nickersons continue to remain in possession of the Property
during the applicable redemption period, their argument is not ripe, nor does Idaho law render
the order of sale in this case inappropriate.
Turning next to the Nickersons' contention that they should have been allowed to dictate
the order in which purported underlying parcels that comprised the Property were sold pursuant
to LC. § 11-304, the Nickersons' argument fails and is not properly supported such that it is
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waived. Specifically, the record in this case shows that the Nickerson's took out a loan for
$285,000, in return for which they pledged the Property legally described as:

SITUATE IN THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO.
TOWNSHIP 36 NORTH, RANGE 2 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN
SECTION 22: SEI/4 NWI/4, SEl/4 SWI/4 NW¼
Commonly known as 3165 Neff Road, Orofino, ID 83544.
The District Court ordered the foregoing Property to be sold which the Sheriff did sell "in one lot
or parcel." 13
In their objection before the district court as well as on appeal, the Nickersons' provide
no evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise establishing that the Property is comprised of more
than one parcel and thus it was not error for the district court to have denied their objection and
their arguments should not be considered on appeal. Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 237
P.3d 696, 698 (2010). In fact, the Nickersons' objection is far from clear as to whether they
contend that the Property as legally described above is comprised of multiple parcels which
certainly does not appear in to be the case from the legal description itself. The Nickersons'
opening brief provides no further explanation. Rather a review of the Nickersons' objection
before the district court simply provided they purchased two parcels but only agreed to provide
"one parcel to Coldwell Banker as a security interest when the original loan was negotiated." (R.
pg. 211.)

13

See Sheriffs Certificate of Sale attached hereto and recorded in the Clearwater County land records on August 28,
2017 as Instrument No.231642.
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Based upon the record before the district court as well as this court on appeal, there is no
evidence that the district court erred in denying the Nickersons objection to the order for sale.
And because this Court "will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and
authority in the opening brief," the district court's rulings should be affirmed. See Bagley v.
Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, (2010); quoting Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 599 (2006).

V.

THE NICKERSONS' REMAINING ISSUES ON APPEAL ARE WAIVED.
For the first time on appeal, the Nickersons' raise two new challenges. First they contend

that an entity other than PHH submitted a credit bid thereby voiding the enforceability of the
Sheriffs Sale that took place on August 28, 2017. Second they contend that this Court should
overturn its decision in Nickerson I because of a Settlement Agreement and Consent Order
recently entered into between Respondent and the Idaho Department of Finance. Again, the
Nickersons' arguments are meritless.
First, as a procedural matter, both of the foregoing issues are being raised for the first
time on appeal and thus are not properly before this Court. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp v.
Butcher, 157 Idaho 577, 581 (2014)(noting that an issue presented on appeal must have been
properly preserved in the court below and issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered by the Court.) Additionally,
The Idaho Appellate Rules require an appellant to support its contentions "with
citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied
upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). Thus, it is "well settled" that an issue on appeal will not be
considered if it is "not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument."
Bowles v. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999)
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Even
where an issue is "explicitly set forth in the party's brief' as one of the bases for
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appeal, if it is" only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent
argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." Dawson v.
Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382-83, 234 P.3d 699, 706-07 (2010)
(citing Inama v. Boise Cnty. ex rel. Bd. o/Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324,330, 63 P.3d
450, 456 (2003)).
Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012). Further, as noted by the Court
in Nickerson 1:
"This Court does not review an alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses
an adverse ruling forming the basis for the assignment of error." Ada Cnty.
Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, l 45 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d
323, 331 (2008). "'This Court will not search the record for error. We do not
presume error on appeal; the party alleging error has the burden of showing it in
the record."' VanderWal v. Albar, Inc., 154 Idaho 816, 822, 303 P.3d 175, 181
(2013) (quoting Miller v. Cal/ear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122
(2004)).
PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 399 (2016).
Due to the Nickersons' failure to have raised either of these arguments before the district
court, they have waived these issues on appeal.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, even if the Nickersons' newest claims had been properly
raised, they are both meritless. Specifically, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale which was issued
clearly states that the Property was purchased via credit bid by the Respondent and not
"Genworth Financial" as alleged by the Nickersons. 14
Additionally, the Settlement Agreement and Consent Order included with the Nickersons
14

While it is the Nickersons' obligation to present a complete record on appeal and they have failed to do so by
failing to include any evidence supporting their contention that someone other than the Respondent purchased the
Property at the foreclosure sale via a credit bid, out of an abundance of caution and for the Court's convenience, it is
attached hereto. See State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488 (2009)(noting that it is the appellant's burden to
produce a record demonstrating error and if they present an incomplete record, the Court will not presume error.)
As a publically recorded document, recorded on August 28, 2017 as Instrument No. 231642, this is a document of
which the Court may take judicial notice. The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale clearly sets forth that the Property was
purchase by the Respondent.
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opening brief still does not provide any direct evidence to support any of the Nickersons'
accusations or arguments in this matter.

Rather, courts that have been faced with similar

attempts to enforce and/or use such consent decrees have found that borrowers such as the
Nickersons lack standing to enforce such judgments as a matter of law but also via the express
provisions of the consent orders. See Duque v. Wells Fargo, NA., 462 S.W.3d 542, 549-550
(Tex. App. 2015); see also Appellant's Brief, Addendum, Ex. I, pg. 12-13, Sec. 21 and 27
(noting that only the State Mortgage Regulator has standing to enforce the Agreement and that
the Agreement does not create any private rights or remedies against Respondent); see also

United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813 (9 th Cir., 2008)(interpreting a similar provision to
section 27 in the Respondent's settlement agreement and consent order with the State ofldaho to
preclude enforcement by third parties.)
For the foregoing reasons, the Nickersons' new arguments on appeal fail.

VI.

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.
Respondent requests costs and attorney fees against the appellant pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 12-121 on the grounds that it is the prevailing party in this matter and appellant has brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. See Lower Payette Ditch

Co., v. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291 (2011). Here, the gravamen of the Nickersons' appeal is to seek
to re-litigate this Court's ruling in Nickerson I. This Court already ruled that the Nickerson's
previous appeal was pursued "frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation" and the
present appeal is nothing more than a second attempt to re-litigate the same issues and arguments
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already considered by this Court when it affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
and final judgment in favor of Respondent in Nickerson I, and when it denied the Nickersons
petition for re-hearing. The law of the case doctrine clearly bars the Nickersons' attempts to relitigate the judgment in this matter and thus it cannot be said that the they have acted in good
faith or with reasonable basis in law or fact.
Lastly, the Nickersons' request for attorney fees should be denied where "this Court has
long held that prose litigants are not entitled to attorney fees." Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho
224 (2009).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the district court's decisions should be affirmed in all
respects and this matter should be allowed to come to its inevitable conclusion. The Property has
been sold and the Nickersons have lost all rights in the Property, subject to their right to revive
their interests through redemption .

Dated: February

Jo ,2018
./IA_

Respectfully submitted,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that two copies of the Respondent's Opening Brief
and this certificate of service was served upon the following designated parties, by first class
mail, at the address listed below:
Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Road
Orofino, ID 83544

Dated and certified this

db -/1,_ day of February, 2018
ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP
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EXHIBIT A

231642,'

PETER J. SALMON (ID SBN 6659)
SYDNEY K. LEAVITT (ID SBN 8933)
ALDRIDGE FITE, LLP
13125 W Persimmon Ln. Ste. 150
Boise, ID 83713
TELEPHONE: (858) 750-7600
FACSIMILE: (858) 412-2789
E-mail: sleavitt@aldridgepite.com

Instrument# 231642
CLEARWATER COUNTY , OROFINO, IDAHO
8-28-2017
03:49:00 PM No. of Pages: 3

~
Recorded for: CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF 1
CARRIE BIRD
Fee: 16.00
~
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy
"§
!nd~x to: SALE, SHERIFFS CERTIFICATE OF
~...«

C.c,

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2011-0000028

SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SALE

V.

CHARLES NICKERSON, D'ONNA
NICKERSON; COLDWELL BANKER
MORTGAGE; J.P. MORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A.; KNOWLTON & MILES PLLC;
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
Defendants.

The Sheriff of Clearwater County, State of Idaho, do hereby certify that, by virtue of an
Order for Sale of Foreclosure entered on April 13, 2017, and Writ of Execution on Judgment of
Foreclosure issued on April 25, 2017, in the above-entitled action, directed to me, setting forth a
judgment recovered in the amount of$385,276.45, lawful money of the United States, to be
satisfied out of the real property of Defendants, belonging to the said Defendants on the day said
judgment became a lien thereon, or attachment or execution was levied herein, or thereafter,
according to said writ and the statutes in such cases made and provided, I have levied on, and

SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SALE
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posted in the a newspaper of general circulation in Clearwater CoUI1ty, Idaho for (3) three
consecutive weeks on July 11, 2017, July 18, 2017 and July 25 th 2017,and also posted the Real
Property at 3165 l\'EFF ROAD, OROFINO, ID, 83544 and the following (3) three places in the
Courthouse Precinct and (3) places in the Precinct of the Real Property to be sold:
Courthouse Precinct:

1. 150 Michigan A venue

2. 330 Michigan Avenue
3. College/Johnson Street
Rea!Property's Precinct:

I. Crow Bench/Neff Road
2. 3165 Neff Road
3. 245 Main

On the 28th day of August, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. at the location of the Cleruwater County
Courthouse, 150 Michigan Ave., Orofino, ID 83544, sold at public auction, in one lot or parcel to
PHH Mortgage, c/o PHH Mortgage Services, One Mortgage Way, Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054,
without recourse, together with its successors and assigns, who was the highest bidder, in the
sum of $333,000.00, which was bid in credit by purchaser, claim and interest of the within
named Defendants, as aforesaid, in and to the real estate located 3165 NEFF ROAD,

OROFINO, ID, 83544 particularly described as follows, to-wit:
SITUATE IN THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO.
TOWNSHIP 36 NORTH, RANGE 2 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN
SECTION 22: SEl/4 N\Vl/4, SEl/4 SWl/4 NW ¼
And that the said real estate is subject to redemption within one year after the sale if the
real property sold consisted of a tract of land more of twenty (20) acres , pursuant to the

SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SALE
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statute in such case made and provided, except: No exceptions.
This Sheriffs Certificate of Sale confirms that the WJit of Execution on Judgment
of Foreclosure issued on April 25, 2017, has been satisfied and, therefore, the Writ can be
returned to court.

GNEN UNDER MY HAND. On this 28 th day of August, 2017

By:

--'~""'"' ----'--'-~----'"?"/J,____________
c~iAQATERCOUNTYSHERWF

STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

)
)

On this 28 th day of August, 2017, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for
said County and State, personally appeared Chris Goetz, known or identified to me to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument as Sheriff of Clearwater County, State
ofidaho, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Sheriff of Clearwater
County, State ofidaho.
/

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set;,ny'ha
day and year first above written.
/'l'/
/
/

~.,,,,,,,,.

I

l

SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SALE
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